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ABSTRACT 
 
      Laboratory errors may occur in every stage of laboratory management process and lead to a 
considerable harm to inpatients. This study was aim to investigate the Proactive risk assessment of the 
laboratory management process in Ghaem Hospital, Mashhad (2013). This was a descriptive research 
that quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed some failure modes and effects. In order to classify the 
modes of failure and effective causes of them and also determining the improvement strategies, we have 
used "nursing error management association", "Eindhoven" and "theory of inventive problem solving" 
models respectively. In 5 steps of laboratory management process which is conducted on17 listed sub-
processes, on average 59 error modes in each ward was identified. 18.7% of error modes were identified 
as high risk errors (hazard score ≥ 8). Most of error causes were related to human factors (42.7%).In 
addition, 31.6% of preventive measures were assigned in human resources management strategy group 
and 16.9% in team work group. The Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis method was very 
efficient in identifying failure modes, determining causes which impact each failure mode, and 
proposing improvement strategies for laboratory management processes of Ghaem Department. 
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INTRODUCTION 
       Medical errors are considered as a serious 
problem in health system and a threat to 
patient’s safety [1,2]. Laboratory errors were 
introduced as one of the most prevalent errors of 
healthcare system in medical council reports 
[3]. Performing laboratory test is a very 
complicated process [4]. According to 
laboratory management process, sample 
analysis process includes 3 main components: 
pre analysis, analysis and post analysis phases 
[5]. Laboratory errors may occur in every stage 
of laboratory management process and lead to a 
considerable harm to inpatients [6]. 
Results from a recent investigation indicates 
that while on average 46 to 68.2 percent of 
laboratory errors are related to the pre-analysis 
phase, 7 to 13 percent of them are related to 
analysis phase and18.5 to 47 percent are related 
to post analysis phase [7]. Results of a study 
showed that 95 % of the total 129 reported 
incidences of laboratory errors had led to harm 
to the patients [8]. According to estimations, 
almost one in 10 people who are admitted to 
hospital, experience an adverse event and about 
half of these events are preventable [9]. Adverse 
events have resulted in an extra expenditure of 
about 37 billion US dollars in America and one 
to two billion pounds in England [10]. 
Preventing treatment errors is one of the 
principles of quality in healthcare. During 
recent years many strategies have been used to 
reduce laboratory errors [6]. According to US 
accreditation commission for healthcare and 
national center for patient safety, Healthcare 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis is one of the 
most reliable programs in risk management and 
preventing errors [11]. Healthcare Failure Mode 
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and Effect Analysis is a systematic and 
predictive strategy which is designed 
specifically for healthcare organizations to 
identify and prevent errors before they happen 
[12, 13]. This is a suitable method to identify 
and prioritize the risks in order to promote 
patient’s safety and reduce potential errors in 
every system [12, 14]. Results indicate that 
during the past 60 years and after 
implementation of quality improvement 
programs, the rate of human errors in laboratory 
section has plummeted from16% to 0.04% [15]. 
Since the main concern of healthcare systems is 
preserving patients’ safety [16] and clinical 
laboratory data are directly effective in medical 
diagnosis and treatment of patients and as a part 
of healthcare system are error-prone [6], this 
study is conducted in 2013 to assess the risk of 
laboratory management process in selected 
wards of Ghaem education and treatment center 
by HFMEA. 
 
METHODS 
     This research studied failure modes and 
effects based on HFMEA model with mix-
method(qualitative action research- and 
quantitative -descriptive- cross sectional-).. This 
study is conducted on laboratory management 
process in selected wards of Ghaem education 
and treatment center in Mashhad, from April to 
July 2013. 
Ghaem as a general first grade hospital has 815 
active beds, 18 wards and 7 emergency wards. It 
also has clinical and Para clinical services and is 
one of the largest education and treatment 
centers in the region and the country. This 
center is a medical education research unit and a 
training center for students in professional and 
super professional levels as well. 
This research used five steps of health care 
failure modes and effects analysis methodology 
which was presented by VA national center for 
Patients’ Safety (13), however some 
modifications in performance were made duo to 
situation. 
Step1: Define the HFMEA topic 
    According to the opinion of 8 experts in 
Ghaem hospital and also adverse events which 
were reportedto clinical governance office in the 
center, the lab management process in 4 wards 
(ENT surgery, Emergency surgery, Pediatric 
emergency and Gynecology surgery) were 
chosen to be analyzed. 
Step 2: Assembling the team 
    In this process, 10 individuals participated 
from each ward including head of risk 
management(team leader), coordinator of 
healthcare management (consultant), head 
nurse, head of department(assistant professor), 
resident (medical assistant), two nurses, 
secretary and laboratory technical manager ( 
laboratory supervisor) were participating as 
members of HFMEA experts team. 
Step 3: Graphically Describing the Process 
     In this step, the primitive diagram of 
laboratory management process was drawn by 
observation method and interview with experts 
to make horizontal integration in selected 
wards. Then, the validity of processes and sub-
processes flow were assessed in a focus 
discussion group by team members and proper 
correction were made. The final process flow 
was designed by Visio. 
Step 4: Conducting Hazard Analysis which 
was done in 4 phases: 
Phase 1: Determining the potential failure 
modes 
     In this phase, by means of triangle method 
[17], modes of laboratory sub-process errors in 
each selected ward was identified and by 
“nursing errors in clinical management model 
(NECM)”was classified. Nursing errors relating 
to clinical management (NECM taxonomy) is a 
toolused to describe contributing factors and 
patient consequences. The main categories are: 
nursing care process, communication, 
administrative process and knowledge and skill 
[18]. 
Phase 2: Determining the hazard score 
      The Hazard score was determined based on 
hazard scoring matrix (multiplying severity to 
probability of failure occurrence), and was 
registered in the HFMEA work sheets. 
The sum of failure mode severity scores 
according to team members’ opinions and with 
considering weight for failure mode severity 
dimensions, and the sum of failure mode 
probability scores based on involved personnel 
opinion also with considering coefficient for 
each person, were calculated and documented in 
final worksheet. In this phase failure modes 
based on their scores in hazard scoring matrix 
were divided to four intervention levels;” 
emergency, urgent, programming and 
monitoring” [19]. (Table 1)  
Phase 3: Designing decision making tree 
    The non-acceptable risks (risk score level 
more than 8)of each selected ward were 
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transferred to decision tree. Decision for 
proceed or stopping each of failure modes was 
made based on three items; weakness points, 
Existing control and Detestability. 
Phase 4: in this phase, through cause and effect 
analysis sessions, effective causes of every 
continuous error mode in the decision tree are 
identified and they are classified by means of 
Eindhoven model.Eindhoven Classification 
Model (ECM) is a tool used to analyze the root 
causes of a broad set of unintended events. This 
distinguishes five main categories and 20 
subcategories. The main factor category is: 
technical, Organizational, Human, Patient-
related factor, Unclassifiable. [20] 
Step 5: Actions and Outcome Measures which 
were performed in two phases: 
Phase 1: Description of Action:  
    In this phase the suggested confronting 
strategies for effective causes of every error 
mode was presented in the form of acceptance, 
control and elimination of errors. 
Phase 2: Redesigning the process: 
     In team sessions and by means of “theory of 
inventive problem solving” method [21], 
improving strategies for each cause of error 
mode was presented and it was decided about 
feasibility of implementing every strategy 
according to organization resources. 
It should be mentioned that after achieving 
consensus by interview and group discussion 
(seven sessions of 2 hours at the end of each 
step), all information of HFMEA worksheet 
items were put together. The whole spent time 
for individual interview in all stages of the 
research was 8 hours. 
 
RESULTS  
     In 5 steps of laboratory management process 
in each selected ward, 17 sub-process and on 
average 59 error modes were identified. The 
proportion of detected error modes for each 
activity and in every step and the whole process, 
are shown in table 2. On average 35 (59.3%) 
error modes of the laboratory process in 
selected wards were related to pre-analysis 
errors, 15 (25.4%) of them were related to 
sample analysis and 9 (15.2%) of them were 
related to post- analysis errors.  
According to “nursing errors in clinical 
management model”, 63.3% of laboratory 
management process error modes were assigned 
in the category of care process (15.8% errors in 
clinical judgment, 
40.2% in Clinical task execution and 7.3% in 
Continuity of care errors), 10.9% assigned in 
communication error category (9.7% error in 
written communication and 1.2% error in verbal 
communication), 15.8% assigned in 
administrative errors (0% error in fail to bed 
management, 15.8% error in supervision and 
planning) and 9.7% of errors assigned in 
knowledge and skill errors (8.5% lack of 
knowledge and 1.2% lack of skill). Overall 2 
(3.5%) error modes in ENT surgery, 19 (31.6%) 
error modes in Gynecology surgery, 14 
(23.7%) error modes in emergency surgery and 
9 (15%) error modes in pediatric emergency 
wards were identified and transmitted to the 
decision tree as high risk and unacceptable 
errors in laboratory management process (risk 
score ≥ 8). 
In addition in table 3, classification of causes of 
high risk and unacceptable errors (risk score ≥ 
8) according to Eindhoven model and in table 4, 
classification of strategies and preventive 
measures for causes of high risk error modes in 
laboratory management process (risk score ≥ 8) 
are shown. In table 5, due to the great number of 
high risk error modes (risk score ≥ 8), only 
unacceptable high risk error modes (risk score ≥ 
12) are presented in HFMEA worksheet.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Hazard score and priority matrix 
 Intervention level  Severity 
 
Probability 
Catastrophic  
(4) 
Major  
(3) 
Moderate 
(2) 
Minor 
(1) 
 emergency =level1 Frequent (4) 16 12 8 4 
 urgent=level2 Occasional (3) 12 9 6 3 
 Programming =level3 Uncommon (3) 8 6 4 2 
 Monitoring=level4 Remote(1) 4 3 2 1 
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Table 2. Distribution of error modes according to matrix of intervention levels and proportion of error modes for every step to 
all error modes of laboratory management process 
 
stage 
Process 
steps 
N
o
. 
o
f 
su
b
-
p
ro
ce
ss
 
Proportion 
of error 
modes of 
each step to 
all of errors 
in that ward 
% 
Proportion of 
error modes 
of each step to 
all errors of 
the process % 
M
a
x
im
u
m
 
er
ro
r 
sc
o
re
 
M
in
im
u
m
 
er
ro
r 
sc
o
re
 
em
er
g
en
cy
 
le
v
el
s(
N
) 
cr
it
ic
a
l 
le
v
el
s(
N
) 
P
ro
g
ra
m
m
in
g
 
le
v
el
s(
N
) 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 
le
v
el
s(
N
) 
E
N
T
 s
u
rg
er
y
 
Pre-
analysis 
Test 
request 
6 17 (30.3%) 7.2% 6 1 0 0 6 11 
Sampling 
& 
sending 
4 15 (26.7%) 6.3% 6 2 0 0 3 12 
analysis analysis 4 15 (26.7%) 6.3% 6 4 0 0 13 2 
Post 
analysis 
Result 
issuance 
1 4 (7.1%) 5.9% 9 6 0 2 2 0 
Report to 
physician 
2 5 (8.9%) 2.1% 6 2 0 0 2 3 
su
rg
er
y
 
Pre-
analysis 
Test 
request 
6 19 (31.6%) 8.08% 12 2 1 3 13 2 
Sampling 
& 
sending 
4 17 (28.3%) 7.2% 9 4 0 8 9 0 
analysis analysis 4 17 (25%) 6.3% 12 6 1 1 13 0 
Post 
analysis 
Result 
issuance 
1 4 (6.6%) 1.7% 12 9 2 2 0 0 
Report to 
physician 
2 5 (8.3%) 2.1% 9 6 0 1 4 0 
P
ed
ia
tr
ic
 e
m
er
g
en
cy
 
Pre-
analysis 
Test 
request 
6 19 (31.6%) 8.08% 9 2 0 3 14 2 
Sampling 
& 
sending 
4 17 (28.3%) 7.2% 9 3 0 1 15 1 
analysis analysis 4 15 (25%) 6.3% 9 6 0 2 13 0 
Post 
analysis 
Result 
issuance 
1 4 (6.6%) 1.7% 9 6 0 3 1 0 
Report to 
physician 
2 5 (8.3%) 2.1% 6 4 0 0 5 0 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 s
u
rg
er
y
 
Pre-
analysis 
Test 
request 
6 19 (32.2%) 8.08% 9 3 0 4 14 1 
Sampling 
& 
sending 
4 16 (27.1%) 6.8% 9 4 0 3 13 0 
analysis analysis 4 15 (25.4%) 6.3% 9 6 0 3 12 0 
Post 
analysis 
Result 
issuance 
1 4 (6.7%) 1.7% 9 6 0 3 1 0 
Report to 
physician 
2 5 (8.4%) 2.1% 9 6 0 1 4 0 
Note: This table describes the numbers concerning sub-process and failure modes identified for the 5 phases of the laboratory 
management process in selected wards .Also, the MAX and MIN hazard score were calculated for each phase. 
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Table 3. Classification of causes of high risk error modes according to Eindhoven model 
                        ward 
error cause ENT surgery 
Gynecology 
surgery 
Emergency 
surgery 
Pediatric 
emergency 
Total 
te
ch
n
ic
a
l 
External 0 0 0 0 0 
Design 0 0 0 0 0 
Structure 1 3 2 2 8 
Material 1 8 3 3 15 
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
External 1 2 6 5 14 
Transfer of 
knowledge 
0 1 2 1 4 
Protocols 1 2 1 0 4 
Priorities 
management 
0 3 1 1 5 
culture 2 6 3 2 13 
2
H
u
m
a
n
 f
a
ct
o
rs
 
External 1 1 6 5 13 
Knowledge based 0 1 3 1 5 
Competence 0 2 1 0 3 
Cooperation 0 0 3 3 6 
Evaluation 0 2 0 0 2 
Action 0 2 1 1 4 
Monitoring 1 7 4 3 15 
Slips 0 1 3 1 5 
falling 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 
factors 
Related to patients 0 3 0 0 3 
Unclassified factors 1 1 1 1 4 
Total 9 46 40 29 124 
 
Table 4. Classification of strategies and preventive measures for causes of high risk error modes (risk score ≥ 8) 
ward 
strategy classification 
Emergency 
surgery 
Pediatric 
emergency 
Gynecology 
surgery 
ENT surgery Total 
Human resources management 
 
44 32 51 11 138 
Installation of electronic prescribing 
system 
1 1 0 0 2 
Making people accountable to 
patient’s safety 
7 5 15 2 29 
Medical equipment management and 
process standardization 
8 6 9 4 27 
Improvement of patient identification 
process 
6 6 8 0 20 
Making clear and transparent 
policies and procedures 
9 2 9 5 25 
Making sure about availability of 
suitable technology for quality 
improvement 
3 8 4 0 15 
Continuous training and briefing 
care providers at the beginning of 
employment 
16 0 13 2 31 
Participating patients in treatment 
process 
1 12 8 1 22 
Implementing and monitoring 
suitable changes in clinical processes 
based on analysis of reliable data 
13 2 12 0 27 
Promotion of communication 
amongst treatment team members 
2 22 1 1 26 
Team work 
 
22 22 28 2 74 
Total 
 
132 118 158 28 436 
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Table 5. Healthcare failure mode and effect analysis worksheet for laboratory management process in selected wards 
Risk analysis 
Identification of actions and 
indices 
Error 
modes 
Probable causes 
scoring 
Analysis of decision 
tree 
A
n
al
y
si
s 
co
n
ti
n
u
an
ce
 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
ac
ti
o
n
 
Suggested strategies or 
reasons of cessation 
se
v
er
it
y
 
o
cc
u
rr
en
ce
 
h
az
ar
d
 s
co
re
 
W
ea
k
n
es
s 
p
o
in
t 
E
x
is
ti
n
g
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
D
et
ec
t 
ab
il
it
y
 
R
ep
et
it
iv
e 
re
q
u
es
ts
 o
f 
p
h
y
si
ci
a
n
 f
ro
m
 p
a
te
n
t 
fo
r 
la
b
o
ra
to
ry
 t
es
ts
 
 
3 4 12 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
 
 
1)Lack of 
supervision on 
medical 
residents’ work 
3 3 9 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
el
im
in
at
e 
1)periodic monitoring & 
evaluation of residents 
2)investigating 
competence  of team 
leader and responsible 
persons 3)coordination 
between treatment team 
& residents 4) holding 
initial and periodic tests 
of competence & 
improvement for care 
providers 
2)lack of 
awareness of 
results of 
previous tests 
3 3 9 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
el
im
in
at
e 
1)clear signing and 
sealing by reports 
registrar 2)review of 
policies and procedures 
in hospitals 3)providing 
supportive infrastructures 
4)monitoring the process 
procedure 5)information 
sharing amongst 
treatment team  
3)mismatching 
of test results 
with patient’s 
clinical situation 
(rechecking the 
test results) 
3 4 12 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
1)monitoring clinical 
plans 2)regular 
calibration of medical 
equipment 
3)identification of care 
providers’  weaknesses 
and planning corrective 
interventions to resolve 
identified failures 
D
el
a
y
 
in
 
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
te
st
in
g
 
th
e 
sa
m
p
le
s 
in
 
la
b
o
ra
to
ry
 
 
3 4 12 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
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1)crowded 
laboratory 
3 4 12 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
ac
ce
p
ta
n
ce
 
1)reducing the workload 
and creating shift table 
and preventing 
successive shifts 
2)providing extra work 
force 3)fitting the 
workload with number of 
human forces 
4)coordinating the 
treatment team and 
establishing stress 
management 
2)lack of 
awareness of 
importance of 
the issue 
3 3 9 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
1)holding briefing 
sessions at the beginning 
2)appoint a leader or 
head for the team 
3)sharing the information 
with treatment team 
3)lack of 
supervision of 
technical 
manager on 
procedures 
3 3 9 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
1)periodic monitoring 
and evaluation of 
laboratory ward 
2)checking the 
competence of team 
leader or the responsible 
person 3)monitoring 
temporal sequence of 
process 
D
el
a
y
 i
n
 o
r 
fa
il
u
re
 t
o
 r
eg
is
te
r 
th
e 
te
st
 r
es
u
lt
s 
 
4 2 8 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
 
 
1)test 
characteristic 
(culturing 
positive 
samples) 
3 4 12 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
ac
ce
p
ta
n
ce
 
1)providing a protocol 
about time scales for 
fungal and bacterial tests 
and offering that towards 
2)sending emergency 
samples to laboratories 
out of hospital 
2)fail to analyze 
the sample due 
to sample 
problems 
3 3 9 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
1)promotion of personnel 
awareness of correct 
method of sampling 
2)notifying the true way 
of sampling by technical 
manager 
 
3)high workload 3 4 12 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
1)reducing the workload 
& creating shift tables & 
preventing successive 
shifts 2)providing extra 
work force 3)fitting the 
workload with number of 
human forces 
4)coordinating the 
treatment team & 
establishing stress 
management 
3
)M
is
ta
k
e 
in
 
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
te
st
 r
es
u
lt
s 
b
y
 
la
b
o
ra
to
ry
 
 
3 3 9 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
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1)high workload 
& employees’ 
fatigue 
3 4 12 
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
1)planning and managing 
actions during a work 
shift 2)division of labor 
3)creating the shift tables 
& preventing long shifts 
2)lack of enough 
experience 
3 2 6 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
1)investigating & 
controlling activity & 
checking the final test 
results by technical 
manager 2)policy making 
for introducing new 
personnel with standards 
of the ward 
 
DISCUSSION 
     In this study, by using a preventive method of 
“healthcare failure mode and effect analysis” we 
have worked on identification of probable errors 
and effective causes of every error mode and 
determining the improving strategies of 
laboratory management process in selected 
wards. On average, 35 (59.3%) of laboratory 
process error modes in selected wards were 
related to pre-analysis errors, 15 (25.4%) were 
related to sample analysis errors and 9 (15.2%) of 
them were related to post analysis errors. This 
result is consistent with Dunn and Moga study 
results. In a study Dunn and Moga performed the 
root analysis of laboratory errors from 2000 to 
2008 and found out that from 253 reported 
catastrophic events, 150 (59%) were related to 
pre-analysis errors, 68 (27%) were related to 
sample analysis errors and 35 (14%) of them 
were related to post analysis errors [22]. The 
Results of Hammering's[7] study, in which he 
has done a literature review on laboratory errors, 
is consistent with results of the present study too. 
Since the first step in reducing healthcare errors 
is identification of them, a comprehensive model 
should be created to classify various error modes 
and facilitate cause identification and comparison 
of error modes [23,24]. 
In the present study, according to classification 
of nursing error management model, on average 
63.3% of laboratory management error modes in 
selected wards were classified as care process 
errors, 10.9% as communication errors, 15.8% as 
administrative errors and 9.7% were classified as 
knowledge and skill errors. In a study conducted 
by “nursing errors in clinical management 
model”, most of the errors were classified care 
process errors (66%), communication (22%), 
administrative (6%) and knowledge (5%) 
categories [19]. Since the study conducted by 
nursing error management association is 
retrospective and in our research we have 
prospectively identified and classified laboratory 
management errors, it is not possible to compare 
results with each other. 
In this study, the frequency percentage of error 
causes, according to Eindhoven model, showed 
that 50.7% of error causes are in the group of 
latent errors and subgroups of technical factors 
(18.5%) and organizational factors (32.2%) and 
48.3% of error causes are in the group of obvious 
errors and subgroups of human factors (42.7%) 
and the other causes (5.6%). 
Smith’s study in surgery ward showed that 
according to Eindhoven model, 72.3% of error 
causes are related to human factors, 16.1 % are 
related to organizational factors and 5.7% are 
related to technical factors [25]. In affirmation of 
this subject, results of Snijders et al.’s study in 
NICU ward indicated that according to 
Eindhoven model, 64% of error causes are 
related to human factors, 9% to technical factors, 
22% to organizational factors and 3% are related 
to patient factors [21]. From this aspect that 
human factors are causes of most of incidences, 
results of the present study is consistent with 
Snijders et al.’s study. 
In this study, most of the preventive measures of 
laboratory management process in selected 
wardsare assigned in human resources 
management strategy (31.6%) and team work 
(11.9%) groups. 
Human resources management strategies are 
basic approaches that help organizations to 
shapeindividual’s skills, attitudes and behaviors 
so that they can reach optimum performance to 
achieveorganizational goal [26, 27]. By means of 
this strategy, senior managers of health sector 
can identifyand develop approaches related to 
manpower [28]. In addition, team work strategy 
is an approach topromote association and 
communication between health sector personnel 
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who work independently to improve care 
providing to patients [29]. Shostek and his 
colleagues and US accreditation commission for 
healthcare and also national centerfor patient 
safety believe that achieving patient safety 
depends on team work [30, 31]. In 
Wong,Beglaryan[28]and Nasiripour [32] 
opinion, utilization of human resources 
management strategy is the most important 
approach to improve patient safety and reduce 
clinical errors . Finally it should be mentioned 
that implementing strategies and suggested 
measures, are highly dependent on team work 
and administrative and financial support from 
organization leaders. Duwe et al.’s study showed 
that successful performance of prospective risk 
assessment programs are related to effective and 
strong leadership and continuous commitment of 
the manager [33]. From suggested strategies, 
“theory of inventive problem solving”, “root 
analysis of events and reporting critical results”, 
“continuous supervision and procedure control”, 
“improvement of team communication”, 
“creating equipment maintenance checklist and 
equipment management”, “matching workload 
with staff’, “process simplification and 
elimination of unnecessary steps”, “fundamental 
upgrade of software to register physician’s test 
order”, “ determining the critical scales for tests” 
and “introducing a reference laboratory to 
randomly do some of the important tests in duel 
form (by hospital laboratory and the reference 
laboratory)” as strategies of improvement in 
process of performing, sending and result  follow  
up in all selected wards will place on the agenda. 
HFMEA will lead to allocation of resources to 
problematic parts of the process [34]. But 
determination of high risk errors of every 
organization is based on its environmental and 
organizational atmosphere. Since frequency of 
errors and their severity even in the similar units 
of various hospitals is not the same, we cannot 
compare the results with other institutions. Like 
other qualitative approaches, in HFMEA studies, 
it is hard to show the reduction of adverse events 
after intervention. Therefore we cannot prove the 
promotion of patient safety and analyze the cost 
effect by HFMEA [35]. 
 
CONCLUSION 
     Identification of 235 potential error modes 
and 44 high risk and unacceptable error modes 
from identified errors, performing cause 
detection by means of Eindhoven method and 
offering corrective measures, indicates that 
HFMEA has a high capacity in detection, 
assessment, prioritization and analysis of 
laboratory management risks in selected wards. 
Considering the necessity of healthcare error 
detection for establishing risk management and 
also failure in classification of errors in 
preventive method due to diversity of errors, it is 
suggested to use HFMEA method in other 
treatment processes too. Ultimately, efficacy of 
the mentioned method in the level of performing 
corrective measures is not examined in this study 
and some more investigations are needed to be 
done on it. 
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